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Executive Summary  
National conversations on the economic costs of gun violence tend to focus on the health care costs 
faced by victims, lost productivity, and the financial burden of gun-related health care, enforcement, 
and correctional supervision costs on taxpayers. Despite broad interest in estimating the economic 
costs of gun violence at the national and individual levels, these conversations rarely address the impact 
of gun violence on the health of local economies. We know little about how local economies respond to 
increased gun violence, especially sharp and sudden increases (or surges) in gun violence.  
Do surges in gun violence slow business growth and lower home values, homeownership rates, and 
credit scores in communities? How do increases in gun violence shape local economic health over time? 
To answer these important questions, we assembled and analyzed newly available business 
establishment and credit score data, as well as gunshot and sociodemographic data by census tract, for 
six cities: Baton Rouge, LA; Minneapolis, MN; Oakland, CA; Rochester, NY; San Francisco, CA; and 
Washington, DC. Police departments in four of these cities (Minneapolis, Oakland, San Francisco, and 
Washington, DC) provided gun homicide data. Baton Rouge gun homicide data were retrieved from the 
Parish of East Baton Rouge Open Data Portal. Gun homicide data were not available for Rochester. 
Because the gun violence data and economic indicators did not cover the same time period in all six 
cities, we examined the relationship between gun violence and local economic health differently in 
different cities, considering the availability of data for each city.  
Our findings demonstrate that surges in gun violence can significantly reduce the growth of new retail 
and service businesses and slow home value appreciation. Further, higher levels of neighborhood gun 
violence can be associated with fewer retail and service establishments and fewer new jobs. Higher levels 
of gun violence were also associated with lower home values, credit scores, and homeownership rates.  
We interviewed homeowners, renters, business owners, and representatives of neighborhood 
associations and other nonprofit organizations in these six cities to see how they perceive and respond 
to gun violence. Business owners said they were determined to not allow hardships caused by gun 
violence to put them out of business, but they also detailed the significant costs they incur (in both 
security expenses and lost revenue) to stay open. Respondents of all types noted that gun violence has 
led to certain types of retail and service businesses moving out of the areas where they live and work. 
Across the board, they shared that gun violence hurts housing prices and drives people to relocate from 
or avoid moving to affected neighborhoods. Homeowners, like business owners, are also financially 
affected by gun violence and may be compelled to invest in security technologies to protect themselves, 
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their homes, and their families. The data and research findings from this study can lend a new, 
economically driven lens to responses to gun violence. 
Research Highlights and Implications  
Impact of Gun Violence Surges on Local Business Growth, Home Values, 
Homeownership Rates, and Credit Scores across Cities 
 Gun homicide surges in census tracts reduced the growth rate of new retail and service 
establishments by 4 percent in Minneapolis, Oakland, San Francisco, and Washington, DC.  
 Gun homicide surges in census tracts slowed home value appreciation by 3.9 percent in Baton 
Rouge, Minneapolis, Oakland, San Francisco, and Washington, DC.  
 Gunshot surges in census tracts slowed home value appreciation by 3.6 percent in Oakland, 
Rochester, San Francisco, and Washington, DC. 
 Neither gun homicide nor gunshot surges were observed to reduce homeownership rates or 
credit scores in these cities. These results might indicate that credit scores may be less useful 
than home values for observing the economic impact of gun violence, perhaps because low-
income people of color (who often live in cities) are underrepresented in credit data. 
Homeownership rates might not fall as quickly as home values in response to sudden surges in 
gun violence because selling a home and moving may take a long time or may simply not be 
feasible for some residents.  
Relationships between Gun Violence and Business Outcomes, Home Values, 
Homeownership Rates, and Credit Scores within Cities 
 In Minneapolis, each additional gun homicide in a census tract in a given year was associated 
with 80 fewer jobs the next year.  
 In Oakland, each additional gun homicide in a census tract in a given year was associated with 5 
fewer jobs in shrinking businesses the next year. 
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 In Washington, DC, every 10 additional gunshots in a census tract in a given year were 
associated with 20 fewer jobs among new establishments, one less new business opening, and 
one more business closing the same year.  
 In Washington, DC, each additional gun homicide in a census tract in a given year was associated 
with two fewer retail and service establishments the next year.  
 In San Francisco, there was no association between levels of gun violence in census tracts in a 
given year and business outcomes the next year.  
 Analysis of gun homicides in 2014 and home values, homeownership rates, and credit scores in 
2015 demonstrated that each additional gun homicide in a census tract was associated with the 
following outcomes: 
» A $22,000 decrease in average home values in Minneapolis census tracts and a $24,621 
decrease in Oakland census tracts. 
» A 20-point decrease in average credit scores in Minneapolis census tracts and a 9-point 
decrease in Oakland census tracts. 
» A 3 percent decrease in homeownership rates in Washington, DC, census tracts and a 1 
percent decrease in Baton Rouge census tracts. 
 There were no associations between gun homicides in a given year and home values, 
homeownership rates, and credit scores the next year in Minneapolis, Oakland, San Francisco, 
or Washington, DC, census tracts from 2009 to 2014 or in Baton Rouge census tracts from 
2011 to 2014.  
Implications 
Our results demonstrate that gun violence reduces new business growth and local job opportunities, 
slows home value appreciation, and can impact community members in many ways. To escape a vicious 
cycle where gun violence reduces the economic resilience of communities whose residents are already at 
risk of gun violence, public policy and local efforts should promote a virtuous cycle by simultaneously 
promoting business development, strengthening the economic resilience of communities, and reducing 
gun violence. This requires homeowners and business owners to recognize the benefits of collaborating 
with local governments and other community members to outline local issues and create policies and 
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practical solutions that are connected to the needs of communities. We propose the following 
recommendations to translate our findings into action: 
 Publicize the economic impact of gun violence and promote success stories showing how 
communities benefit from reducing gun violence. 
 Engage businesses as advocates for gun violence reduction strategies. 
 Support collaboration among stakeholders to build on community-based approaches to 
reducing gun violence.  
 Build the evidence base on how gun violence impacts the economic health of local communities. 
Thinking Differently about  
Gun Violence: Gun Violence  
as a Local Economic Health Issue 
National conversations on the economic costs of gun violence tend to focus on the health care costs of 
treating gunshot injuries and the costs associated with lost productivity from people unable to work 
because they commit or are the victims of gun violence. These discussions are mainly concerned with 
the financial burden gun violence places on victims and taxpayers through health care, enforcement, 
and correctional supervision costs. Despite broad interest in estimating the costs of gun violence at the 
national and individual levels, research on the economic impact of gun violence rarely addresses the 
health of local economies. 
What We Know about Prevention Costs  
and Costs to Victims  
Gun violence exacts a physical, emotional, and financial toll on survivors and their families as well as the 
families of victims who lose their lives. The effects of gun violence are also felt by communities in the 
form of reduced investment from businesses and entrepreneurs. Gun violence also imposes significant 
costs on taxpayers and the local governments tasked with addressing the issue.  
At an immediate cost of around $23,000 per patient, gun violence places an immense financial 
strain on victims and the hospitals that serve them.1 In 2010, the total cost nationwide of medical care 
for firearm assaults was just under $630 million, with a significant share of emergency room care costs 
paid by taxpayers (Howell and Abraham 2013). Mental health treatment alone cost an additional $410 
million.2 And Cook and Ludwig (2000) estimated $20–26 billion dollars in lost earnings as a result of gun 
violence in 1997.  
Although these figures are striking, they are small compared to what governments and individuals 
spend trying to reduce the threat of gun violence. Cook and Ludwig (2000) estimated that, in 1997, 
government spending on the criminal justice system and on government preventive expenditures (such 
as funding for the Secret Service; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; and airport 
security and to purchase additional bulletproof vests for law enforcement) would have been $3 billion 
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less in the absence of gun violence. This estimate excluded other potential savings for local public 
housing authorities, public schools, and other government organizations that are more difficult to 
measure. To put this in perspective, the US government spent nearly as much money that year to fund 
entire government agencies—the Department of Commerce’s 1997 discretionary spending budget 
was $4.8 billion.3 
These numbers are even more significant when we consider that the cost of preventive measures is 
not fully covered by government expenditures. Every American is financially affected by the threat and 
fear of gun violence. Because most gun homicides and assaults take place in public spaces (Cook and 
Goss 2014), gun violence can create a sense of vulnerability in communities and among the general 
public. Fear has a financial impact when it leads people to spend money on protective measures such as 
home security technologies. Business owners and community members we interviewed said these 
expenditures played a central role in their struggle to keep their small businesses afloat or otherwise 
deal with gun violence in their daily lives.  
In 1998, a national survey asked respondents how much they would be willing to pay to reduce gun 
violence by 30 percent. Researchers found that the public was willing to pay $24.5 billion annually, or 
$1.2 million per gun-related injury (Ludwig and Cook 2001). Hamermesh (1998, 1999) found that 
workers in US metropolitan areas were less likely than workers elsewhere to work in the evenings and 
at night and that gun homicides are likely to displace night and evening work to daytime work hours. In 
1998, Hamermesh estimated the cost of this displacement to be between $4 and $10 billion (between 
$6 and $15 billion in 2017 dollars).  
Gun violence has a pervasive effect on communities and on the lives of community members. The 
emotional burden of fear weighs on residents exposed to gun violence as well as employees, visitors, 
and consumers (Cook and Ludwig 2000). Residents might take longer and more complex trips to avoid 
neighborhoods with a reputation for gun violence. Fewer tourists visit cities and states that experience 
chronic gun violence or acute surges in gun violence.  
The impact of gun violence on people and businesses translates into costs to taxpayers and 
productivity losses that dampen the economy. A small number of recent studies provide the framework 
needed to think about these greater costs and have quantified and substantiated the public’s 
willingness to invest in gun violence reduction efforts. One can easily intuit the potential effects of 
reduced gun violence on local property values and business openings, closures, operations, and 
profitability based on the protection, avoidance, and investment decisions of consumers and investors, 
but only a handful of studies have explored the economic impact of gun violence on communities.  
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What We Know about Violent Crimes  
and Local Economic Health  
Increases in violent crime can lower property values, reduce business profitability, and decrease 
investment in communities. A longitudinal study by Greenbaum and Tita (2004) found that a localized 
surge in gun homicides can cause businesses in the area to downsize and discourage new businesses 
from opening. Conversely, declines in violent crime have been shown to coincide with economic growth 
(Stacy, Ho, and Pendall 2017).  
Business built around customer interaction, such as those in the retail and service sectors, may see 
revenues drop faster than other nearby businesses as the threat of violence causes patrons to shop in 
safer communities (Greenbaum and Tita 2004). Business owners may also have trouble hiring 
employees willing to travel at night through communities experiencing surges in gun violence 
(Hamermesh 1998). Certain businesses may choose to close rather than spend more on insurance and 
security while bringing in less revenue. However, the high cost of relocating a business means that some 
may be forced to stay in neighborhoods with high levels of gun violence and absorb those losses. But the 
greatest damage to local economies may come from entrepreneurs who choose not to invest in a 
community in the first place because of gun violence. 
Commercial and residential property values have been shown to decrease as levels of gun violence 
increase (Hipp, Tita, and Greenbaum 2009; Kirk and Laub 2010; Shapiro and Hassett 2012). Such costs 
are difficult to measure, but a 2006 analysis of home values and crime at the census tract level found 
that each additional violent crime per 1,000 in low-income neighborhoods was related to a 3.6 percent 
decline in home values the following year, representing an average loss of $4,144 in value in the 
neighborhoods least able to absorb such a drop in wealth (Tita, Petras, and Greenbaum 2006). 
Other studies have measured how property values would benefit from a reduction in gun violence. 
Across five cities, researchers found that a 10 percent reduction in homicides would lead to a 0.83 
percent increase in home values the following year, with a 25 percent reduction producing a 2.1 percent 
increase (Shapiro and Hassett 2012).  
Study Goals  
In this study, we focus on the local economic impact of both surges in gun violence and levels of gun 
violence. Surges in gun violence are sudden increases over and above the typical level of violence in a 
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neighborhood that residents have factored into their daily routines and business plans (Greenbaum and 
Tita 2004). This helps us understand how changes in gun violence affect communities differently. It also 
lets us control for existing levels of gun violence to yield more robust findings. This is critical because a 
study that only examines the relationship between levels of gun violence and indicators of economic health 
may provide a “big picture” perspective of the effect of violence on cities but not a complete picture.  
Below, we briefly describe our study methodology (box 1). A more detailed discussion is available in 
the appendixes. The next section presents our findings on the relationship between levels of gun 
violence and local economic health indicators as well as our findings on how surges in gun violence 
affect business growth, home values, homeownership rates, and credit scores.  
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BOX 1 
Project Methodology  
We collected quantitative and qualitative data on local economic health indicators to (1) understand the 
impact of levels of gun violence and surges in gun violence on local economic health and (2) make relevant 
policy recommendations. At the census tract level, we analyzed a broad range of economic indicators 
(number of businesses and employment in those businesses, home values, homeownership rates, and 
credit scores) and two gun violence indicators (number of and surges in gun homicides and gunshots).  
We conducted regression analyses to compare pre- and postsurge economic indicators between 
neighborhoods that experienced surges and those that did not. We also ran panel and cross-sectional 
regression analyses to explore the association between levels of gun violence and economic outcomes.  
We observed our indicators across six cities: Baton Rouge, LA; Minneapolis, MN; Oakland, CA; 
Rochester, NY; San Francisco, CA; and Washington, DC. These cities were selected for their geographic 
and economic diversity and their wide coverage of gunshot detection data. The economic indicators and 
gun violence data covered different periods in different cities from 2009 to 2015, and the period 
covered by longitudinal data did not overlap for all cities. We used both individual city data and pooled 
data to conduct the analyses needed to examine the relationship between gun violence and indicators 
of local economic health over time, considering the availability of data for each city.  
We also conducted in-person and phone interviews and focus groups to gain local perspectives on 
the economic impact of gun violence. We facilitated a total of 25 semistructured interviews and four 
focus groups with local homeowners, renters, business owners, and other city stakeholders (e.g., 
business and neighborhood associations and other nonprofit organizations). We selected the business 
owners and homeowners by identifying the communities in the study cities that experienced surges in 
gun violence in 2015 and then contacting neighborhood organizations and businesses in those areas. In 
each interview and focus group, we asked how gun violence affected business operations, profitability, 
and investment; home investment and decisionmaking; the housing and rental markets; the daily activities 
of residents; local policies to address gun violence; and the factors that increase a community’s resilience 
against or vulnerability to gun violence. We analyzed interview data with NVivo qualitative analysis 
software. We then synthesized the findings from the quantitative and qualitative analyses into this 
report to provide recommendations framed and supported by existing literature in the field.  
The details of our methodology and regression findings are presented in appendixes B, C, and D.  
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Findings 
City-Specific Analyses of the Relationship  
between Gun Violence Levels and Local Economic Health  
We first examined the relationship between gun violence levels and local economic health within cities. 
For the cities with at least four years of available data, we looked at the relationship between levels of 
gun violence in a census tract in a given year and the number of establishments, employment at those 
establishments, average home value, average credit score, and rate of homeownership the next year. 
This analysis used panel regression models. We also conducted a cross-sectional (one-year) analysis to 
explore the short-term relationship between gun violence and average home values, rates of 
homeownership, and average credit scores after controlling for sociodemographic factors.  
As detailed in box 2, our findings were mixed. The panel regression analyses showed that an 
increase in gun violence levels can be associated with fewer retail and service establishments and fewer 
new jobs. The cross-sectional regression analyses showed that gun violence in a given year can lower 
home values, rates of homeownership, and credit scores the next year. However, the damage gun 
violence inflicted on neighborhoods differed by city. We did not see the same relationships in panel 
regressions observing repeated measures of gun violence, home values, homeownership rates, and 
credit scores. The details of this analysis and the associated regression tables are in appendix B.  
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BOX 2 
Relationship between Gun Homicides and Gunshots and Business Outcomes 
In three of the four cities for which we had the necessary data (Minneapolis, Oakland, San Francisco, 
and Washington, DC), we observed a negative relationship between gun violence and business 
outcomes from 2010 to 2012: 
 In Minneapolis, each additional gun homicide in a census tract in a given year was associated 
with 80 fewer jobs the next year.  
 In Oakland, each additional gun homicide was associated with 5 fewer job opportunities in 
shrinking businesses the next year. 
 In Washington, DC, every 10 additional gunshots were associated with 20 fewer jobs among new 
establishments, one less new business opening, and one more business closing the same year.  
 In Washington, DC, each additional gun homicide was associated with two fewer retail and 
service establishments the next year.  
 In San Francisco, there was no significant association between levels of gun violence and the 
number of establishments and employment outcomes the next year.  
Relationship between Gun Homicide Levels and Home Values, Homeownership Rates, 
and Credit Scores 
In the five cities for which we had the necessary data for a panel regression analysis (Baton Rouge, 
Minneapolis, Oakland, San Francisco, and Washington, DC), we did not observe a significant 
relationship between gun homicides in a given year and home values, homeownership rates, and credit 
scores the next year: 
 Home values. Each additional gun homicide in a census tract in 2014 was associated with a 
$22,000 decrease in the average home value in Minneapolis and a $24,621 decrease in Oakland 
in 2015. However, our observations of gun homicide levels from 2009 to 2014 in Minneapolis, 
Oakland, San Francisco, and Washington, DC, and from 2011 to 2014 in Baton Rouge show no 
significant association between gun homicides in a given year and home values the next year.  
 Homeownership rates. Each additional gun homicide in a census tract in 2014 was associated 
with a 3 percent decrease (approximate) in homeownership rate in Washington, DC, and a 1 
percent decrease in Baton Rouge in 2015. However, our observations of gun homicide levels 
from 2009 to 2014 in Minneapolis, Oakland, San Francisco, and Washington, DC, and from 
2011 to 2014 in Baton Rouge show no significant association between gun homicides in a given 
year and homeownership rates the next year. 
 Credit scores. Each additional gun homicide in a census tract in 2014 was associated with a 20-
point decrease (approximate) in average credit score in Minneapolis and a 9-point decrease in 
Oakland in 2015. However, our observations of gun homicide levels from 2009 to 2014 in 
Minneapolis, Oakland, San Francisco, and Washington, DC, and from 2011 to 2014 in Baton 
Rouge show no significant association between gun homicides in a given year and credit scores 
the next year.  
The details of this analysis and the associated regression tables are in appendix B.  
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Cross-City Analyses of the Impact  
of Gun Homicide Surges on Business Growth  
In this section, we present the results from our regression analyses of the impact of gun homicide surges 
on business growth outcomes at the census tract level in Minneapolis, Oakland, San Francisco, and 
Washington, DC. We also present findings from our interviews with business owners, homeowners, 
renters, and other city stakeholders.  
We borrow from the work of Greenbaum and Tita (2004) to compare pre- and postsurge economic 
indicators between neighborhoods that experienced surges and those that did not (see appendix C for 
our methodology, including our business growth measures and definition of gun homicide surges).  
Our results indicate that surges in gun homicides led to a reduced growth rate of new retail and 
service businesses in comparison to neighborhoods with no surges (box 3). However, surges did not 
affect business closures or cause businesses to lose employees. 
Interviews and focus groups in these cities provided context for these findings. We learned that 
business owners were determined to remain open despite the hardships associated with gun violence. 
Business owners spoke with great pride about their communities but also detailed the significant 
security costs they incur because of gun violence. Owners said these costs, which include camera 
systems, Plexiglass, bulletproof windows, motion sensors, barred doors, and extra security staff, are 
necessary if they wish to stay open.  
Business owners and residents described the coping mechanisms they incorporate into their daily 
lives, such as closing businesses early and keeping doors locked at night during operating hours. 
Residents avoid shopping at night, and employees working night shifts avoid public transit. Residents 
believe these mechanisms are necessary to mitigate the harmful impact of gun violence on their 
economic behavior and businesses. These interviews and focus groups point to the resilience of local 
communities affected by violence, which deserves further study. They also demonstrate that these 
hardships significantly limit investment and the willingness of entrepreneurs to open new businesses in 
these communities. The details of this analysis and the associated regression tables are in appendix C. 
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BOX 3  
The Impact of Gun Homicide Surges on Local Business Growth  
 In cities with the necessary data for our analysis (Minneapolis, Oakland, San Francisco, and 
Washington, DC), gun homicide surges led to a 4 percent reduction (approximate) in the growth 
rate of new retail and service establishments.  
 Gun homicide surges did not affect business closures or cause businesses to lose employees.  
The details of this analysis and the associated regression tables are in appendix C. 
Stakeholders may be reluctant to invest money and resources in communities experiencing surges 
in gun violence because of the fear such violence induces among potential clients. Businesses that rely 
on foot traffic may be especially discouraged from investing in these communities. The following section 
highlights responses from our stakeholder interviews that provide more context on the potential 
disincentive to invest in communities with high levels of and surges in gun violence as well as the coping 
mechanisms residents and business owners use to mitigate the harmful effects of violence.  
Insights from the Interviews 
LACK OF CERTAIN TYPES OF BUSINESSES 
Residents, business owners, and other stakeholders shared that, as a result of violence, the areas where 
they live and work lack certain types of businesses, especially grocery stores, mom-and-pop stores, and 
banks. One Oakland stakeholder said that the neighborhood went a long time without a supermarket, 
and community members had to travel up to 20 miles to find one. Another said people in his community 
are afraid to go out at night and that many empty storefronts remain in areas he believes are ideal for 
restaurants and entertainment venues. Stakeholders and business owners also suggested that violence 
discourages companies of all sizes from opening businesses in their communities. 
We are venturing into opening a grocery store, with health and wellness integrated, in an 
area that has historically been violent. Windows and lighting have been a concern. Is this a 
place where people will do harm? People have asked, “This is where we want to be and 
build?” Safety is a consideration.—City stakeholder, Minneapolis 
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BUSINESS CLOSURES 
Many interviewees know people who have considered closing or relocating their businesses because of 
gun violence or have already done so. One focus group participant said, “We had a [civic association] 
meeting. Practically every business in attendance had been robbed.”  
We lost a McDonald’s. You practically never see that happen. That was because of 
crime…[the store] kept getting robbed.—Focus group participant, homeowner 
FEAR OF VICTIMIZATION AND BEHAVIORAL COPING MECHANISMS 
Fear of violence can drive business and consumer behavior. Our interviews with people living and 
working in the study cities provided in-depth context on how gun violence can significantly impact 
business and employee decisionmaking and overall business performance and profitability.  
As the number of shootings in the city has increased significantly, even the beauty salon that 
I go to had a bullet through the window, and it grazed the head of a pastor’s sister. The 
business has been there for 25 years. For the first time in 25 years, the owners thought about 
safety and whether they can stay.—City stakeholder, Minneapolis 
Interviewees highlighted a perception of violence associated with their neighborhoods. But despite 
the violence, they also see peace and positivity in their communities even if people from outside the 
neighborhood, including close family and friends, do not. Residents and business owners in focus groups 
informed us that their friends and family outside the area fear visiting their neighborhoods or refuse to 
visit at all. This fear impacts businesses as well because people do not move to or shop in these 
neighborhoods and the perception of violence makes it difficult to find and retain employees.  
Interviews also provided insight into the coping mechanisms used by businesses in areas with 
disproportionate levels of gun violence. A common theme was a deep sense of pride and dedication to 
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their communities. Some interviewees shared examples of how community members encouraged and 
supported business owners to remain open in the face of gun violence.  
At a certain point, we were done with the business because of the violence. But I feel like I 
was born and raised here, and you shouldn’t just quit on your own community. …As bad as it 
is, it’s not just here; it’s in other places as well, and I feel like you shouldn’t run away from the 
violence. You should be a part of changing the violence.—Business owner, Oakland  
Some interviewees had a negative perception of their own communities, and several stakeholders 
said they are afraid to go outside in their neighborhoods. One business owner in Oakland referred to his 
neighborhood as “the gutter of the gutter,” and a San Francisco resident told us, “I can’t get a permit for 
my show to be in the playground in the evening because the city said it’s dangerous. But other areas get 
permits. It’s because of [the perception of] this area.” 
Interviews showed that customers are afraid to visit some businesses because of their reputations 
for violence. Often, businesses choose to close earlier in the evening than desired because of an incident 
of gun violence. In certain places, businesses had been put under curfew by the city and forced to close 
at certain hours. When asked about how gun violence affects her daily personal and work routines, one 
Minneapolis business owner said, “If we are here at night, we lock the door at six or seven and we don’t 
open if we are not satisfied. After six, [we] don’t get customers. Sometimes we are here later but don’t 
open the door.” When asked about city regulations on the operating hours of businesses, another 
business owner said, “Yes, [I] have to close at 10:00 p.m., regulated by the city. I wish during the winter 
they close early. I want to close at nine, but my business will go to someone else who will be open at ten.”  
As customers, residents described situations in which they needed the services of a particular 
business in their neighborhood after they got off of work only to find these businesses would close early 
during the week or close entirely on the weekend. One city stakeholder referred to this as a “trickle-
down effect” where stores close early because residents do not want to be outside at night.  
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FEAR OF CRIME AND INCREASED BUSINESS INVESTMENT IN SECURITY  
One of the most frequently discussed financial burdens was increased investment in security for 
businesses. Stakeholders in Minneapolis, Oakland, San Francisco, and Washington, DC, indicated that 
gun violence has caused businesses to invest in security strategies such as camera systems, Plexiglass, 
bulletproof windows, motion sensors, barred doors, and extra security staff. These purchases were 
either made on the business owner’s own initiative or were mandated by the city after a violent incident 
on the premises.  
There are clear financial burdens associated with running a business in a violent area. In these 
areas, stores are robbed frequently and subsequently experience reduced profits or shut down 
completely. Businesses may need to invest additional time and funds to attract customers and 
overcome the stigma associated with their locations. As one focus group participant said, “There is a 
stigma of [this] being a rough neighborhood, and a lot of people don’t come here because of that. The 
shootings right here in this area, it has a big effect on business and we see it.” 
Think about that visible ingesting of it from multiple angles. As a customer coming in, you 
think a place has been hit up, is it safe to get something to eat? Who is coming in the door? An 
employee has to be in bulletproof space every day. Maybe they weren’t there when it was 
robbed, but this is the only job I can get. I have to be in harm’s way/traumatize myself for my 
livelihood. What are the health risks in those scenarios? Is it higher anxiety, higher stress? 
What are the impacts there that may correlate to more doctor’s visits, medication?—City 
stakeholder, Oakland  
ADDITIONAL STRESS ON BUSINESS OWNERS, MANAGERS, AND EMPLOYEES 
Employees may be directly or indirectly impacted by gun violence. Employees working in violent areas 
may experience longer commutes, especially if they work at night. They can also experience heightened 
levels of stress. The manager of a small business in Minneapolis said she no longer uses public transit to 
go to work at one or two in the morning despite using it at other times of day. 
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Even if it is not too late, I am worried about getting home from work and staying late. 
—Resident, San Francisco  
These responses point to how economic behavior is impacted by violence, forcing residents to make 
employment, commuting, and other daily-life choices that have economic costs and consequences for 
both themselves and the community.   
Cross-City Analyses of the Impact of Gun Violence 
Surges on Home Values, Homeownership Rates, 
and Credit Scores  
In this section, we present the results from our regression analyses of the impact of gun violence surges 
on home values, homeownership rates, and credit scores. We observed gun violence surges using gun 
homicide data from Baton Rouge, Minneapolis, Oakland, San Francisco, and Washington, DC, and 
gunshot data from Oakland, Rochester, San Francisco, and Washington, DC (see appendix D for detailed 
methodology and results). Again, our interviews with business owners, homeowners, renters, and other 
city stakeholders supplement our findings.  
Our results indicate that surges in gun homicides and gunshots in census tracts across these cities 
slowed the appreciation of home values (box 4) but did not affect the growth of homeownership rates or 
credit scores. In 2010, close to 20 percent of the adult population nationwide was credit invisible or had 
unscorable credit histories. Members of low-income black and Hispanic communities are more likely to be 
part of this group (CFPB 2015). Accordingly, credit scores might not be as useful of an indicator as home 
values because of the potential underrepresentation of low-income communities of color in credit data. 
Homeownership rates pose their own issue, as they are determined by the long-term demographic 
economic fundamentals of neighborhoods and might not reflect sudden surges in gun violence. 
Our interviews and focus groups provided insight into the perceived negative impact of gun 
violence on the real estate market. Respondents also detailed the significant costs homeowners incur 
because of gun violence. Some homeowners who lived in increasingly violent neighborhoods either 
chose to relocate or knew people who had. The details of this analysis and the associated regression 
tables can be found in appendix D. 
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BOX 4  
The Impact of Gun Homicide and Gunshot Surges on Home Values, Homeownership Rates,  
and Credit Scores  
 In cities with the necessary data for our analysis (Baton Rouge, Minneapolis, Oakland, San 
Francisco, and Washington, DC), surges in gun homicides slowed home value appreciation by 3.9 
percent. 
 In cities with the necessary data for our analysis (Oakland, Rochester, San Francisco, and 
Washington, DC), surges in gunshots slowed home value appreciation by 3.6 percent. 
 Gun homicide and gunshot surges were not observed to affect homeownership rates or credit 
scores.  
The details of this analysis and the associated regression tables can be found in appendix D. 
Insights from the Interviews  
GUN VIOLENCE AND HOUSING VALUES 
Across the board, residents, business owners, and stakeholders believed that gun violence hurts 
housing prices and drives people to relocate from or avoid moving to affected neighborhoods. For 
instance, one focus group participant mentioned that a friend “paid $250,000 for their house and now 
they can’t sell it for $100,000 because of the violence.”  
IMPACT OF GUN VIOLENCE ON RESIDENTS AND WITNESSES OF VIOLENCE 
All interviewees said they have changed their daily routines or lifestyles to avoid violence. Many stay 
home more than they might otherwise, and some do not stay out late or go out alone in the evenings. 
Business owners and other focus group participants reiterated that violence changed their routines and 
limits their activities outside of work. Interviewees also shifted their routines to protect their children. 
One Oakland business owner and resident said, “I want to move to some other area, especially for my 
kids. They are growing up. Sometimes they close the school down because there’s a shooting outside 
and I can’t pick up my kids because the school gets shut down.”  
Gun violence affects both victims of violence and the neighbors who witness violent incidents. One 
Minnesota business owner and resident shared an incident that occurred on their street in 2012: “The 
man was robbed, shot, and [his house was] set on fire. I saw the police dragging out his body and trying 
to resuscitate him. …[I] moved when I was able to move—lived there for six years.”  
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GUN VIOLENCE, VACANCY RATES, AND ABSENTEE HOMEOWNERS 
Stakeholders said that vacancy rates are high in violent neighborhoods. They also identified absentee 
homeownership as problematic because these owners do not maintain their properties or feel invested 
in the community.  
GENTRIFICATION, RENTAL VALUES, AND GUN VIOLENCE 
Many interviewees expressed their concern over displacement caused by increasing rents. 
Respondents have seen changes in the racial makeup of their neighborhoods, and some held negative 
views of gentrification. Despite the ongoing racial and economic change, they said, crime rates remain 
high and rents continue to climb.  
GUN VIOLENCE AND INCREASED SAFETY MEASURES AT HOME 
Homeowners use a variety of security technologies to protect their homes and families. Respondents 
mentioned tall fences, door gates, motion sensors, and cameras as the primary security measures they 
use. In some cities, interviewees said the local government subsidizes the cost of home security 
equipment to help residents protect themselves.
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Translating Research into Action 
Publicize the Economic Impacts of Gun Violence 
and Promote Success Stories Showing How Communities 
Benefit from Reducing Gun Violence 
Raise awareness of the risks of increasing levels of gun violence for diverse geographies, groups, and 
businesses. Local campaigns should focus on the economic issues that plague business development and 
sustainability.  
Increase media engagement to address the economic impact of gun violence. Media sources play a 
key role in establishing perceptions of neighborhood crime and violence and can support gun violence 
prevention strategies (Bieler et al. 2016). Positive media coverage can help raise awareness and 
showcase efforts to reduce gun violence and support local economic development. Local governments 
and businesses should collaborate to develop strategies for traditional and social media.  
Engage Businesses as Partners and Advocates 
for Gun Violence Reduction Strategies  
Support and develop public-private-community partnerships. One model is Detroit’s Project Green 
Light, which mixes technology and community policing to improve neighborhood safety, promote the 
revitalization and growth of local businesses, and strengthen police efforts to deter, identify, and solve 
crimes.4 This partnership between the City of Detroit and local business owners installs and maintains 
high-definition indoor and outdoor cameras, high-speed network connections capable of consistent 
video streaming to local police departments, and adequate lighting on properties to ensure they are 
customer-friendly, safe, and inviting. 
Incentivize safety measures. Implement (or continue providing) incentives to install additional 
safety features (e.g., cameras, property and street lighting). Small but meaningful rewards could be 
given to encourage business owners to partner with police. 
Prioritize local resources to support efforts to reduce gun violence and promote local business 
and community development. Efforts should target the local business districts most affected by gun 
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violence while promoting broader conversations about local solutions to local problems and 
emphasizing use of economic incentive programs to bring in new businesses.  
Support Collaboration among Stakeholders 
to Build on Community-Based Approaches 
Create nonenforcement community engagement opportunities. Local governments should focus on 
building long-term, positive collaborations between government, community members, and business 
owners to develop solutions to gun violence. 
Implement violence reduction strategies at the city, neighborhood, and community levels. A 
holistic violence reduction model should include stakeholders with knowledge of the economic impact 
of gun violence in areas with disproportionate levels of or surges in gun violence. Preventive 
approaches that focus on educating youth and young adults about gun violence should be aligned with 
education and training to improve their economic prospects.  
Mobilize business and community stakeholders for strategic planning and publicize their 
successes. This report provides considerable evidence to support the inclusion of economic 
stakeholders at all levels in gun violence prevention strategies. Local entities should expand economic 
stakeholder groups to include local business owners, chambers of commerce and business 
organizations, and local government officials associated with business development. In communities 
without strong private-sector involvement in city or community politics, businesses of all types should 
be key proponents of community and city branding activities. 
Promote cross-sector collaboration among researchers, community organizations, community 
development institutions, police practitioners, and funding agencies. Crime reduction should be seen as 
a multifaceted economic health issue that requires bringing business owners into stakeholder 
conversations with other public and private sector entities. 
Invest in evidence-based social services interventions. Local governments should encourage state 
and national governments to invest in evidence-based research on the impact of gun violence on local 
economies. They should also ask state and national policymakers to support evidence-based 
interventions and cross-sector collaboration across a diverse range of stakeholders, including local 
business owners.  
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Build the Evidence Base on the Impact of Gun Violence 
on the Economic Health of Local Communities 
Establish a link between gun violence and the choices of business owners and residents. Local 
stakeholders, including governments, policymakers, and social services providers, should collaborate to 
develop data collection systems that examine local perceptions of the economic impact of gun violence 
through local business owner and resident decisionmaking. A hyper-local (e.g., city, county, etc.) review 
of economic health is an essential first step for devising strategies to support local businesses in areas 
disproportionately affected by violence. This study can stand as a model for mixed-method data 
collection at the community level and for data analysis in cities across the United States.  
Use new data sources to showcase the relationship between gun violence and local economic 
health. Local stakeholders should develop local data repositories to enhance decisionmaking and 
collaboration across organizations. Local partners should also focus on collecting and storing new data 
on local economies in areas disproportionately affected by gun violence. A central repository accessible 
by all local stakeholders should focus on increasing local data quality through standardized 
implementation and updating practices. 
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Conclusion 
This study helps show that gun violence can perpetuate or even cause economic decline. Gun violence 
slows new business growth, which leads to fewer job opportunities for community residents—including 
those at risk of engaging in gun violence. Gun violence also decreases home values, which along with 
slow business growth impacts government revenue and affects the economic resilience of communities, 
further increasing their vulnerability to surges in gun violence.  
To escape this vicious cycle, public policy and local efforts should seek to promote a virtuous cycle 
where business development promotes economic well-being, creates jobs, and reduces gun violence. 
Both homeowners and business owners have strong incentives to collaborate to reduce gun violence. 
Community members should be incentivized to join these collaborations to outline pressing issues and 
ensure that policies address those issues and the needs of the community.  
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Appendix A. Retail and Service 
Industry Codes  
TABLE A.1 
Retail and Service Industry Codes 
Code  Industry title 
52 Building materials, hardware, garden supply, and mobile home dealers 
53 General merchandise stores 
54 Food stores 
55 Automotive dealers and gasoline service stations 
56 Apparel and accessory stores 
57 Home furniture, furnishings, and equipment stores 
58 Eating and drinking places 
59 Miscellaneous retail 
70 Hotels, rooming houses, camps, and other lodging places 
72 Personal services 
73 Business services 
75 Automotive repair, services, and parking 
76 Miscellaneous repair services 
78 Motion pictures 
79 Amusement and recreation services 
80 Health services 
81 Legal services 
82 Educational services 
83 Social services 
84 Museums, art galleries, and botanical and zoological gardens 
86 Membership organizations 
87 Engineering, accounting, research, management, and related services 
89 Services not elsewhere classified 
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Appendix B. Methodology  
and Regression Results  
for City-Specific Analyses  
Data Sources 
The analysis presented in this section is based on the following data sources: 
 Gun homicide data were acquired from the city police departments of Minneapolis, MN; 
Oakland, CA; San Francisco, CA; and Washington, DC; as well as the City of Baton Rouge, LA, 
and the Parish of East Baton Rouge, LA, Open Data Portal. 
 Washington, DC, gunshot data were obtained through a data file made publicly available online 
by the Metropolitan Police Department in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. 
Gunshot data for the other cities were obtained from SST, Inc.  
 Business data were retrieved from the 2013 National Establishment Time-Series Database. 
 Data on home values, homeownership rates, and credit scores were obtained from a major 
credit bureau. 
 Sociodemographic data were retrieved from the US Census Bureau American Community 
Survey five-year estimates.  
Dependent Variables 
We used five annual measures to operationalize local economic health at the census tract level: number 
of establishments, employment at those establishments, average home value, average credit score, and 
homeownership rate (see table B.1).  
The data to calculate establishment and employment outcomes were acquired from the 2013 
National Establishment Time-Series Database, which was developed through a partnership with Dun & 
Bradstreet and includes more than 52 million establishments with time-series information about their 
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industries, location (by street address), headquarters, employment, and many other indicators from 
1990 to 2012.  
While observing the number of establishments and employment at those establishments, we 
conducted subcategory analyses for shrinking, new (birth), and closed (death) establishments in all 
industry categories and in retail and service industry categories specifically (see appendix A for the list 
of retail and service industries). We used Greenbaum and Tita’s (2004, 2499) definitions to formulate 
our definitions of shrinking, birth, and death establishments. A birth establishment had no employment 
at its location in the previous year and positive employment in the current year. A death establishment 
had positive employment in the previous year and no employment in the current year. Shrinking 
establishments had some employment in the previous year and less employment in the current year.  
To measure the average home value, homeownership rate, and credit score outcomes, we 
constructed panel data of consumer credit score measures at the census tract level. Our data are based 
on a random 2 percent sample of depersonalized consumer data from a major credit bureau. The same 
information was collected for each consumer from 2010 to 2015, creating panel data with six 
snapshots. To identify each consumer’s census tract location, the credit bureau matched their name and 
address to a national public property record database maintained by CoreLogic. The credit bureau data 
are a random sample of all US consumers who have a credit record with the bureau, and the national 
public property record database covers the market very well. Still, 31 percent of consumers did not 
have a match between the two databases. To address potential biases, we weighted the matched data 
with American Community Survey Public Use Microdata Sample data to make the matched credit 
bureau and property record data follow the same joint distribution as the Public Use Microdata Sample 
data on three attributes: consumer age, housing tenure status, and geographic location. 
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TABLE B.1 
Local Economic Health Measures  
Employment  
Employment in all establishment categories (hereinafter referred to as “all establishments”) 
Employment in retail and service industry establishments (hereinafter referred to as “retail and service 
establishments”)  
Employment in all new (birth) establishments  
Employment in new (birth) retail and service establishments  
Employment in all shrinking establishments  
Employment in shrinking retail and service establishments  
Establishment count  
Number of all establishments  
Number of retail and service establishments  
Number of all new establishments  
Number of new retail and service establishments  
Number of all out-of-business (death) establishments  
Number of out-of-business (death) retail and service establishments  
Number of all shrinking establishments  
Number of shrinking retail and service establishments  
Average home value 
Homeownership rate 
Average credit score 
Panel Regressions with Fixed Effects 
We explored the impact of gun violence on our five local economic health indicators over time. In our 
analysis, we were unable to capture the annual change in demographic variables because the American 
Community Survey provides only five-year estimates for demographics at the census tract level and 
smaller territorial boundaries (such as block groups).  
Considering the panel nature of our data and the unavailability of annual demographic variables, we 
incorporated year and census tract fixed effects estimates into our panel regression models to benefit 
from within-group variation over time and overcome endogeneity issues. A fixed effects regression 
model essentially assumes that unobservable factors that might simultaneously affect the outcome and 
the predictor are time-invariant.  
To estimate the effect of gun violence on economic activity, we ran fixed effects regressions in the 
following form: 
 (𝐸𝑖𝑡)  = 𝛿0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑉𝑖𝑡−1  +  𝛾𝑖  +  𝜆𝑡  +  𝑢𝑖𝑡  (1) 
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where the equation was estimated at the census tract level for each city separately. Eit is the observed 
economic outcome in census tract i in year t. GV is the total number of homicides (or gunshots for 
Washington, DC, only) in census tract i in year t-1, and i  and t are year and census tract fixed effects, 
respectively. Specifically, we modeled the relationship between gun violence and our local economic 
health indicators as follows:  
 We first explored the impact of gun homicides in a given year on business outcomes (i.e., 
number of establishments and number of employees) in the next year from 2010 to 2012. We 
conducted this analysis for Minneapolis, Oakland, San Francisco, and Washington, DC, the 
cities for which we had the four-year data overlap necessary to observe the association 
between one year’s gun homicides and the next year’s business outcomes over three years.  
 In Washington, DC, where the gunshot and business data time spans overlapped exactly, we 
also explored the impact of gunshots in a given year on business outcomes in the same year from 
2010 to 2012, assuming increased levels of gunshots have an immediate rather than lagged 
effect on business growth.  
 We ran additional regression analyses to explore the association between gun homicides in a 
given year and average home values, average credit scores, and homeownership rates in the 
next year from 2010 to 2015 in Minneapolis, Oakland, San Francisco, and Washington, DC. For 
Baton Rouge, where gun homicide data were only available as of 2011, we explored the impact 
of gun homicides on those indicators from 2012 to 2015. 
 We further explored the association between gunshots in a given year and average home 
values, average credit scores, and homeownership rates in the next year from 2014 to 2015 in 
Oakland, Rochester, and San Francisco. In Washington, DC, where gunshot data were available 
from 2010 to 2012, we explored the impact of gunshots on those indicators from 2011 to 2012. 
Cross-Sectional Regressions 
with Sociodemographic Controls 
To examine the relationship between gun homicides and average home value, homeownership rate, and 
average credit score over a year, we ran additional cross-sectional regression analyses on the 
relationship between gun homicides in 2014 and our chosen indicators in 2015, controlling for the 
effects of several sociodemographic variables: percent black population, percent population with high 
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school education or higher, median household income, and population density. We focused on 
outcomes from 2015 to better control for the effects of the sociodemographic factors using the 
American Community Survey 2014 five-year estimates.  
Detailed Results  
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GUN VIOLENCE LEVELS AND BUSINESS OUTCOMES 
Table B.2 shows the results of our regression analyses on the 14 establishment and employment 
outcomes over the number of gun homicides in Minneapolis, Oakland, San Francisco, and Washington, 
DC. The results reported in the table control for year and census tract fixed effects.  
We further examined the relationship between gunshots in a given year and the number of 
establishments and employment in those establishments that same year in Washington, DC. Our 
analysis showed that, in census tracts covered by gunshot detection sensors, every 10 additional 
gunshot incidents were related to 20 fewer jobs in new establishments (p ≤ 0.01), one less business 
opening (p ≤ 0.05), and one more business closure (p ≤ 0.05) the same year.   
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TABLE B.2 
Gun Homicide Fixed Effects Ordinary Least Squares Regression on Establishment Number  
and Employment  
City and industry Birth Death Shrinking Total  
Minneapolis         
All      
Establishment -3.4 (2.8) 1.5 (1.2) -0.1 (0.2) -2.42 (1.55) 
Employment -79.8 (60.9) N/A -4.3 (7.7) -80.0 (44.8)† 
Retail and service     
Establishment -3.0 (2.3) 0.7 (0.7) -0.01 (0.17) -1.8 (1.1) 
Employment -79.8 (60.9) N/A -0.3 (5.1) -42.8 (27.0) 
Oakland         
All     
Establishment 0.6 (0.8) 0.3 (0.4) 0.1 (0.1) 0.5 (0.6) 
Employment 16.3 (9.7) N/A -5.2 (3.1)† 12.1 (11.5) 
Retail and service     
Establishment 0.3 (0.7) 0.2 (0.3) 0.16 (0.1) -0.8 (4.1) 
Employment -0.14 (2.9) N/A -0.9 (1.3) -2.6 (5.6) 
Washington, DC         
All     
Establishment -5.2 (3.5)  0.4 (0.5)  -0.1 (0.5)  2.9 (1.8) 
Employment 4.7 (21.6)  N/A 1.29 (2.44)  -31.5 (129.2)  
Retail and service     
Establishment 0.9 (1.3)  -2.7 (1.3)  -0.1 (0.1)  -1.9 (0.8)* 
Employment -6.4 (10.7)  N/A 0.8 (1.2)  34.9 (22.9)  
San Francisco     
All     
Establishment 5.7 (8.3) -0.9 (1.6) -0.06 (0.3) 3.1 (1.93) 
Employment 39.6 (49) N/A 13.8 (14.4) 90.2 (103.6) 
Retail and service     
Establishment  3.5 (5.4) -1.51 (1.93) -0.05 (0.24) -9.1 (18) 
Employment  17.8 (19.3) N/A 4.86 (3.13) -912 (800) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
† p ≤ 0.1; * p ≤ 0.05 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GUN VIOLENCE LEVELS AND HOME VALUES, 
HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES, AND CREDIT SCORES  
We further examined the association between gunshots and gun homicides in a given year and average 
home values, homeownership rates, and credit scores in the next year by running panel regression 
analyses with fixed effects estimates. We found no significant associations for any city included in this 
analysis.  
A P P E N D I X  B  2 7   
 
CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION ANALYSES WITH SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS 
To examine any potential immediate relationship between gun homicides in 2014 and home values, 
homeownership rates, and credit scores in 2015, we ran additional regression analyses controlling for 
2014 sociodemographic variables. Table B.3 shows those results.  
TABLE B.3 
2014 Gun Homicide Ordinary Least Squares Regression on 2015 Average Home Values, 
Homeownership Rates, and Average Credit Scores 
City  Home value Homeownership rate Credit score 
Minneapolis       
Homicides -22,009† -0.01 -19.7***  
Percent black -551 -0.001 -1.55*** 
Percent high school education 
or higher 1,145 0.002 1.14† 
Median household income 2.1*** 2.143E-6*** 0.001** 
Population density  1.9 -2.641E-6 0.001 
R2 0.47 0.34 0.56 
Oakland       
Homicides -24,621† -0.004 -8.7* 
Percent black -1,848* 0.001 -1.8*** 
Percent high school education 
or higher 4,151*** 0.001 1.6*** 
Median household income 3.56*** 2.669E-6*** 0.001 
Population density 1.68 1.758E-6 0.001 
R2 0.75 0.44 0.63 
Washington, DC       
Homicides 1,500 -0.03* -6.4 
Percent black -4,374*** 0.002** -1.3*** 
Percent high school education 
or higher -5,307† 0.005** 0.6 
Median household income 3.38*** 1.408E-6*** 0.001 
Population density  -4.48** 4.270E-7 0.001 
R2 0.60 0.20 0.63 
San Francisco    
Homicides -31,564 -0.025 -7.4 
Percent black -6,548* -0.001 -1.17*** 
Percent high school education 
or higher -4,543 0.004 0.464 
Median household income 5.611*** -4.257E-7** 0.001 
Population density 1.12 4.612E-7 -0.001*  
R2 0.32 0.06 0.24 
Baton Rouge     
Homicides -179 -0.01† 0.49 
Percent black -946*** 0.001 -1.01*** 
Percent high school education 
or higher 1,660*** 0.002 1.72** 
Median household income 0.8** 4.208E-6*** 0.001 
Population density -1.09 7.043E-6 -0.002 
R2 0.69 0.56 0.64 
† p ≤ 0.1; * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001 
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Appendix C. Methodology  
and Results for Gun Violence  
Surge Analysis with Business 
Growth Outcomes  
Data Sources 
The analysis presented in this section is based on the following data sources: 
 Gun homicide incident data were retrieved from the city police departments of Minneapolis, 
MN; Oakland, CA; San Francisco, CA; and Washington, DC.  
 Business data were retrieved from the 2013 National Establishment Time-Series Database, 
described in appendix B. 
 Sociodemographic data were retrieved from US Census Bureau American Community Survey 
five-year estimates.  
Methods  
This analysis explored the impact of gun homicide surges on business growth outcomes in census tracts 
across different cities. Our methodology borrows from the work of Greenbaum and Tita (2004), who 
studied the impact of structural changes or surges in the level of violence, rather than only levels of 
violence, on ZIP code–level growth rates in the number of establishments and employment in those 
establishments. As Greenbaum and Tita explain, the definition of surges in crimes requires an 
operationalization based on arbitrary decisions.  
Because of differences in gun homicide levels across cities, surges were defined for each city. For 
the purposes of our analysis, we considered a census tract to have experienced a surge if, following a 
baseline year (2010), it had at least one more gun homicide in the subsequent (observation) year and its 
level of gun homicide was above the 50th percentile among all census tracts with increases in gun 
homicides. Census tracts in each city that experienced a surge in 2011 were matched with control 
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census tracts that had an increase in gun homicides but not a surge. Our dependent variables were 
annual growth rates, at the census tract level, of net employment and components of net employment: 
establishment births, deaths, and shrinkages (see table C.1 for the list of growth outcomes and appendix 
B for a definition of establishment births, deaths, and shrinkages).  
We calculated growth rates for all establishment categories and retail and service industry 
categories. The growth rate for each category of establishment is estimated as follows: 
 𝐺  𝑖𝑡
𝑗 = (𝐸  𝑖𝑡
𝑗 − 𝐸  𝑖𝑡−1
𝑗 )/𝐸  𝑖𝑡−1
𝑗
 (2) 
where growth G in each category j (all establishments, new establishments, and shrinking 
establishments) in census tract i is calculated by subtracting the employment in that category in the 
census tract in the previous year from the employment in the same category and census tract in the 
current year and dividing it by the total employment in the census tract in the previous year.  
Growth rates for the number of establishments that are births and deaths for each category are 
defined as follows: 
 𝐺  𝑖𝑡
𝑗 = 𝑁  𝑖𝑡
𝑗 /𝑁𝑖𝑡  (3)  
where N is the number of establishments. To calculate the growth in the number of shrinking 
establishments in equation 3, the E in equation 2 is replaced with N.  
TABLE C.1  
Dependent Variables 
Employment growth outcomes  
Employment growth in all new (birth) establishments 
Employment growth in new (birth) retail and service establishments 
Employment growth in all shrinking establishments 
Employment growth in shrinking retail and service establishments 
Establishment growth outcomes  
Growth in the number of all establishments  
Growth in the number of all retail and service establishments  
Growth in the number of all new establishments 
Growth in the number of new retail and service establishments 
Growth in the number of all out-of-business (death) establishments 
Growth in the number of out-of-business (death) retail and service establishments 
Growth in the number of all shrinking establishments 
Growth in the number of shrinking retail and service establishments 
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We used propensity score matching and difference-in-difference estimates to examine the impact 
of surges in gun homicides on the aforementioned growth outcomes. We ran these analyses at the 
census tract level for all establishment types and for a subset of retail and service establishments (see 
appendix A for the list of retail and service establishments).  
Propensity Score Matching  
To compare economic activity in census tracts that experienced a surge in gun homicides with activity in 
census tracts with no surge, every census tract in each city that had a surge in 2011 needed to be 
matched with a census tract in the same city that did not. As explained earlier, prior research shows that 
business activity could respond to crime and violence levels in the area where the business is located 
(Greenbaum and Tita 2004). Thus, substantial changes in violence levels in a neighborhood can affect 
business activity differently than in a neighborhood with consistent violence levels.  
Data to match the gun homicide surge and control census tracts on key sociodemographic 
indicators in each city—percent black population, median household income, percent with a high school 
education or higher, and population density—were retrieved from American Community Survey five-
year estimates for 2006–10.  
Table C.2 shows the number of gun homicides in each city in 2010 and 2011, and table C.3 shows 
the number of census tracts in each city that had an increase in gun homicides in 2011 and whether the 
increase qualified as a surge. 
TABLE C.2  
Number of Gun Homicides  
 2010 2011 
Minneapolis 39 37 
Oakland 78 100 
San Francisco  33 35 
Washington, DC  97 77 
Sources: City police departments of Minneapolis, MN; Oakland, CA; San Francisco, CA; and Washington, DC. 
  
A P P E N D I X  C  3 1   
 
TABLE C.3 
Census Tract Surge by City 
 Surge 
Increase  
but no surge 
Minneapolis 5 15 
Oakland 15 33 
San Francisco  2 22 
Washington, DC  11 18 
Total 33 88 
The surge and control census tracts were also matched on a baseline level of gun homicides. In each 
city, we used nearest neighbor matching with replacement to match the propensity score of each 
census tract with a surge in gun homicides to a census tract without a surge that had the closest score in 
its probability to surge based on demographic indicators. After matching, we used difference-in-
difference estimates to compare changes in the growth indicators (see table C.5) from before and after 
surges in the 33 census tracts that surged with their matched control census tracts that did not.  
Detailed Results  
Table C.4 presents the summary results from the eight regression analyses to observe the impact of 
surges on annual growth rates in new business creation (establishment births), business destruction 
(establishment deaths), and business shrinkage (establishments losing employees).  
TABLE C.4 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression on Establishment Growth Rates  
Establishment type New Closed Shrinking Total 
All  -0.030 -0.002 0.018  -0.013 
Retail and service  -0.038† -0.011 0.001 -0.014 
Notes: Reported coefficients are the difference between the pre- to postsurge change in the surge census tracts and matched 
control census tracts with no surge. The sign in front of the coefficients indicates the direction of the relationship between surges 
and measured outcomes. For instance, a negative sign in front of the coefficient for new retail and service establishments 
indicates that surges result in a decrease in growth, whereas a positive coefficient for shrinking businesses indicates an increase in 
growth rate of shrinking businesses.  
† p ≤ 0.1 
Surges reduced the growth rate of retail and service establishments by 3.8 percent, though the 
results showed no significant impact on business creation for all industry categories. No other impact 
estimates were significant. Surge census tracts experienced higher growth rates of business shrinkage 
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in all establishment categories (1.8 percent) and retail and service establishment categories (0.1 
percent) than control census tracts. Again, this impact estimate did not reach statistical significance. 
Gun homicide surges did not have a significant impact on business deaths either. We further examined 
if these surges in gun homicides had any significant impact on employment growth in new and shrinking 
establishments. As shown in table C.5, we found no statistically significant impact across all 
establishments or the subset of retail and service establishments.  
TABLE C.5 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression on Employment Growth Rates  
Establishment type New Shrinking 
All establishments  0.03 -0.01 
Retail and service  -0.01 -0.01 
Notes: Reported coefficients are the difference between the pre- to postsurge change in the surge census tracts and matched 
control census tracts with no surge. The sign in front of the coefficients indicates the direction of the relationship between surges 
and measured outcomes.
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Appendix D. Methodology  
and Results for Gun Violence  
Surge Analysis with Home Values, 
Homeownership Rates,  
and Credit Scores  
Data Sources 
The analysis presented in this section is based on the following data sources: 
 Gun homicide data were acquired from the police departments of Minneapolis, MN; Oakland, 
CA; San Francisco, CA; and Washington, DC; as well as the City of Baton Rouge, LA, and the 
Parish of East Baton Rouge, LA, Open Data Portal. 
 Gunshot data for the analysis were available for Oakland, CA; Rochester, NY; San Francisco, CA; 
and Washington, DC. Washington, DC, gunshot data were obtained through a data file made 
publicly available online by the Metropolitan Police Department in response to a Freedom of 
Information Act request. Gunshot data for the other cities were obtained from SST, Inc. 
 Home values, homeownership rates, and credit scores were retrieved from a major credit 
bureau (see appendix B for a detailed description of these data). 
 Sociodemographic data were retrieved from US Census Bureau American Community Survey 
five-year estimates.  
Methods 
This analysis explored the impact of surges in gun homicides and gunshots on average home value, 
homeownership rate, and average consumer credit score at the census tract level. We used propensity 
score matching and difference-in-difference estimates to examine if surges affected these outcomes.  
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Propensity Score Matching  
To compare home values, homeownership rates, and credit scores in census tracts that experienced a 
surge in gun violence with those in census tracts that had not, every census tract that had a surge in the 
observation year needed to be matched with a similar census tract that had not. We used two different 
operationalizations to formulate gun homicide and gunshot surges because gunshots are more frequent 
than gun homicides.  
First, we operationalized gun violence surges with the gun homicide data acquired from the city police 
departments. We considered a census tract to have experienced a surge if, following a baseline year 
(2013), the census tract had at least one more gun homicide in the subsequent (observation) year and its 
level of gun homicide was above the 50th percentile of gun homicides in all census tracts with increases in 
gun homicides. The census tracts in each city that experienced a surge were matched with control census 
tracts that had an increase in gun homicides but not a surge. Table D.1 shows the number of gun homicides 
in each city in 2013 and 2014, and table D.2 shows the number of census tracts in each city that had an 
increase in gun homicides in 2014 and whether the increase qualified as a surge.  
TABLE D.1 
Number of Gun Homicides  
 2013 2014 
Baton Rouge 53 70 
Minneapolis 28 26 
Oakland 82 73 
San Francisco  45 33 
Washington, DC  81 71 
Sources: City police departments of Baton Rouge, LA; Minneapolis, MN; Oakland, CA; San Francisco, CA; and Washington, DC. 
TABLE D.2 
Census Tract Surge by City 
 Surge 
Increase 
but no surge 
Baton Rouge 12 12 
Minneapolis 3 8 
Oakland 2 23 
San Francisco  6 17 
Washington, DC  10 20 
Total 33 80 
Data to match the gun homicide surge and control census tracts on key sociodemographic 
indicators—percent black population, median household income, percent with a high school education 
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or higher, and population density—were retrieved from American Community Survey five-year 
estimates for 2010–14. Surge and control census tracts were also matched on baseline number of gun 
homicides in the census tract. In each city, we used nearest neighbor matching with replacement to 
match the propensity score of each census tract with a surge to a control census tract without a surge 
that had the closest score.  
Second, we operationalized gun violence surges with gunshot data acquired from SST, Inc and the 
Metropolitan Police Department of Washington, DC. We considered a census tract to have experienced 
a surge if it had an increase in gunshots in a given year from the baseline year and was in the top 25 
percentile of all census tracts with the highest count increase in gunshots from the baseline. The 33 
surge census tracts were matched with control census tracts in the same city that had an increase in 
gunshots but were not in the top 25 percentile. Table D.3 shows the number of gunshots in each city in the 
baseline year and the observation year, and table D.4 shows the number of census tracts in each city that 
had an increase in gunshots in the observation year and whether the increase qualified as a surge.  
TABLE D.3 
Number of Gunshots 
 Baseline  Observation  
Oakland 3,823 3,575 
Rochester 2,588 1,534 
San Francisco  1,570 1,457 
Washington, DC  4,760 5,338 
Sources: City Police departments of Minneapolis, MN; Oakland, CA; San Francisco, CA; and Washington, DC. 
Notes: Baseline and observation years for Oakland, Rochester, and San Francisco are 2013 and 2014. The baseline and 
observation years for Washington, DC, are 2010 and 2011. The number of gunshots excludes records of gunshots on December 
31, January 1, and July 4.  
TABLE D.4 
Census Tract Surge by City 
 Surge 
Increase  
but no surge 
Oakland 6 26 
Rochester 2 6 
San Francisco  10 37 
Washington, DC  15 55 
Total 33 124 
After matching, we used difference-in-difference estimates to compare pre- and postsurge home 
values, homeownership rates, and credit scores in surge and control census tracts.  
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Detailed Results  
Impact of Gun Homicide Surges on Home Values, Homeownership Rates, 
and Credit Scores 
Table D.5 presents the summary regression results from the regression analyses conducted to observe 
the impact of gun homicide surges on home values, homeownership rates, and credit scores at the census 
tract level. Gun homicide surges led to a decrease in average home values. Home value appreciation in 
census tracts that had a surge in gun homicides was 3.9 percent lower after the surge than in control 
census tracts (p ≤ 0.05). No other impact estimates were significant.  
TABLE D.5 
Gun Homicide Ordinary Least Squares Regression on Home Values, Homeownership Rates,  




coefficient Standard error t  p > ItI 
Credit score growth 7.342 12.227 0.60 0.549 
Home value appreciation  -3.998 1.957 -2.04 0.043* 
Homeownership growth  0.001 0.037 0.04 0.969 
Notes: Reported coefficients are the difference between the pre- to postsurge change in the surge census tracts and matched 
control census tracts with no surge. The sign in front of the coefficients indicates the direction of the relationship between surges 
and measured outcomes.  
* p ≤ 0.05 
Impact of Gunshot Surges on Home Values, Homeownership Rates, 
and Credit Scores  
We further examined if gunshot surges had any significant impact on home values, homeownership 
rates, and credit scores at the census tract level. Table D.6 summarizes the results from three 
regression analyses. Gunshot surges in census tracts also led to a decrease in average home values. 
Home value appreciation in census tracts that had a surge in gunshots was 3.6 percent lower after the 
surge than in control census tracts (p ≤ 0.01). Again, we detected no significant relationship between 
surges in gun homicides and mean credit scores and homeownership rates. 
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TABLE D.6 
Gunshot Ordinary Least Squares Regression on Home Values, Homeownership Rates,  




coefficient Standard error t  p > ItI 
Credit score growth 6.903 15.518 0.44  0.657 
Home value appreciation -3.603 1.288 -2.80 0.006** 
Homeownership growth 0.009  0.045 0.21 0.833 
Notes: Reported coefficients are the difference between the pre- to postsurge change in the surge census tracts and matched 
control census tracts with no surge. The sign in front of the coefficients indicates the direction of the relationship between surges 
and measured outcomes.  
** p ≤ 0.01 
 3 8  N O T E S  
 
Notes 
1. Natasha Bertrand, “A Breakdown of the $229 Billion Gun Violence Tab that American Taxpayers Are Paying 
Every Year,” Business Insider, April 24, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/gun-violence-costs-america-
more-than-229-billion-every-year-2015-4. 
2. Mark Follman, Julia Lurie, Jaeah Lee, and James West, “What Does Gun Violence Really Cost?” Mother Jones, 
May/June 2015, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/04/true-cost-of-gun-violence-in-america. 
3. “1997 United States Budget,” InsideGov, accessed April 25, 2017, http://federal-
budget.insidegov.com/l/100/1997. 
4. “About Project Green Light Detroit,” Project Green Light Detroit, accessed April 24, 2017, 
http://www.greenlightdetroit.org/about/. 
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